When our evidence suggests we should believe one thing, and our practical interests suggest another, what should we believe? Philosophers have taken this to be the question are there practical reasons for belief? Evidentialists argue that there cannot be any such reasons. Putative practical reasons for belief are not reasons for belief, but (to quote Pamela Hieronymi) reasons to manage our beliefs in a particular way. Pragmatists are not convinced. They accept that some (or perhaps all) reasons for belief are practical. According to the Pragmatist, there is a nontrivial way in which practical reasons could justify belief.
In this paper, I argue for three related theses: First, that we should reformulate the question as what reasons govern belief management? When we do, existing views are not adequate. Evidentialism is mute; Pragmatism incurs a heavy explanatory burden. Secondly, I develop an account of belief management, and characterize two forms that belief management might take: alethic and manipulative. Our original cases are asking whether manipulative belief management is rationally permissible (or required). Finally, I argue that the nature of practical reason itself gives us categorical (though potentially defeasible) reasons to engage in alethic belief management. Evidentialism, I conclude, percolates from action.
This Lecture is co-sponsored by the
Texas Tech Humanities Center
